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Death and Organization: Heidegger’s thought on death and life in 
organizations 
 
Abstract 
Mortality has not been given the attention it deserves within organization studies, 
even when it has been considered it is not usually in terms of its implications for own 
lives and ethical choices. In particular, Heidegger’s writing on death has been almost 
entirely ignored both in writing on death and writing on organizational ethics, 
despite his insights into how our mortality and the ethics of existence are linked. In 
this paper we seek to address this omission by arguing that a consideration of death 
may yield important insights about the ethics of organizational life.  Most important 
of these is that a Heideggerian approach to death brings us up against fundamental 
ethical questions such as what our lives are for, how they should be lived, and how we 
relate to others. Heideggerarian thought also re-connects ethics and politics as it is 
closely concerned with how we can collectively make institutions that support our life 
projects rather than thwart or diminish them. 
Keywords 
Heidegger, Death, Ethics, Choice, Organization 
Introduction 
Death is not only universal, it is, arguably, the most feared of human experiences.  In 
modern societies, death has become highly institutionalized as well as increasingly 
the object of management and organization (Bauman, 1992; Howarth and Jupp 
1996; Kearl 1989; Seale 1998; Smith 2006).  The management of death in modernity 
has resulted in what Giddens (1991) has termed the sequestration of death from our 
everyday lives (see also Clark 1993; Rees 2001; Willmott 2000).   
Although such sequestration has not resulted altogether in the absence of death from 
organizational studies (see Barton Cunningham 1997; Carr and Lapp 2006; Gabriel 
1999; Grant and Wade-Benzoni 2009; Sievers 1994; Smith 2006; Willmott 2000, for 
example) death still tends to be presented in organization theory in ways that limits 
its disruptive power to enable us to think about our own existential choices and our 
relations to others.  Indeed, we are critical of much writing about personal mortality 
and organization as it is framed in ways that we believe still evades the ‘brutal fact of 
death’ (Glaser and Strauss 1965: 3) and fails to see death as a reason for 
fundamentally questioning the purpose of organizations and our place in them.   
Heidegger’s philosophy, which he produced from the 1920s to the 1960s, has had a 
profound effect on contemporary thinking including psychology, theology, linguistics 
and modern theories of the text.  As such he has been a major influence on thinkers 
such as Ricoeur, Satre, Gadamer and Derrida and is considered by many to have 
been one of the most pivotal and original thinkers of the 20th century (Kearney 1994).  
Despite this, as Sköldberg (1998) also notes, he is relatively neglected within 
organization studies even though, as we argue below, his writing on technology and 
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on ethics is directly relevant to it1.   However, our primary focus in this paper is to 
highlight his thinking on death and its role in the ethics of existence – as we argue 
that this has important implications for the ethics of organizational life. The almost 
total neglect of his writing on death by organizational theorists (though, again, see 
Sköldberg 1998) is puzzling given the centrality of death to his analysis of the nature 
of human being.  As Cohen has argued ‘no thinker has analyzed human mortality 
with greater precision, made it more central to human existence, given it more 
prominence for thought, especially the thought of Being, than Heidegger’ (2006: 21). 
What work there is on death in organization studies tends to largely (though not 
exclusively) focus on the way in which fear of our approaching death is ameliorated 
by minimising our contact with its manifestations (Smith 2006). Other work treats 
death as a metaphor as in organizational demise (Barton Cunningham 1997) or seeks 
to delineate the impact of death, loss and mourning on organizations (Lapierre 1989; 
Ritzer 2000; Wolfram Cox 1997). Another stream of literature seems to us to reduce 
a consideration of death to simply another managerial way of seeing the world, 
framing mortality ‘useful’, a method of analysing organizations from the viewpoint of 
managerial control.  Others, in contrast, have written of the way in which modern 
forms of organization were implicated in the technologized mass slaughter of the 
holocaust (Bauman 1989; Burrell 1997).  Finally, a vast library of related work in the 
health sciences prescribes how grief and mourning should themselves be ‘managed’ 
(Cooper and Mitchell 1990; Mohan 2001; Olson, et al. 2001; Williams 1966, for 
example).   
Whilst we will review some of this work in more detail below, our primary concern 
will be with organizational ethics, particularly the way in which facing up to our 
mortality reframes the purposes and nature of organization.  Following Heidegger’s 
thought we thus aim to demonstrate that death, and our attitude to it, is a neglected 
but significant issue within debates on what would constitute a worthwhile life as 
lived out with others in organizations; furthermore we argue that our response to 
death has implications for what kind of organization might facilitate such a life. We 
suggest therefore, that a Heideggerian approach to death, stimulates thinking about 
ethical questions such as what our lives are for, how they should be lived, how we 
relate to others and how we can collectively make institutions that support our life 
projects rather than thwart them.  We argue that such questions are rarely at the 
centre of debates in organization studies but that this neglect is problematic as much 
of our lives are lived in and through organizations of various kinds.  
So we begin our discussion with a brief evaluation of how death is conceptualised 
within current work on organization studies, going on to contrast these 
conceptualizations with an approach we base upon Heidegger.  We argue that a 
Heideggerian approach has much to offer organization studies – both in his thinking 
on mortality and in his ethics of resolute facing up to death – ideas that are more 
likely to stimulate radical thinking about our lives within organizations than ideas 
about death currently in the organizational literature.  Thus we hope to make a 
contribution to more critical work on organizational ethics, particularly those which 
argue that the neglect of 20th century philosophers, including Heidegger, has led to 
                                                          
1 There is, however, a related fairly substantial body of literature on existentialism broadly defined going back for the last thirty 
years (Manning 1973; Kallinikos 1992a; Kallinikos 1992b) and we draw on these resources in our later discussion of the 
implications for Heidegger’s thought for organization studies. 
4 
 
an unwarranted exclusion both of politics and broader existential issues from their 
needful consideration in organizational ethics (Parker 2003). We believe that 
Heidegger is a particularly appropriate thinker in the task of reconnecting ‘What 
should I do?’ with the question ‘Who am I?’ (Weaver 2006: 344). 
Death and Organization Studies 
To begin our brief review of how death tends to be invoked in organization studies, 
we consider the most common invocation of death – death as a metaphor 
(Cornelissen and Kafouros 2008): as species extinction, for example, within 
population ecology perspectives. This metaphor is typically employed in 
understanding how organizations can adapt to their environments within strategic 
management theory (Frishammar 2006).  Similarly, a metaphorical use of death is 
apparent in writing on ‘career death’ (Barton Cunningham 1997; Lapierre 1989) or 
the loss of organizational identity attendant upon mergers (Wolfram Cox 1997).  The 
difficulty for us of thinking of death as a metaphor is that it distances us from its 
brute materiality and so from facing up to the fact of our own physical death.  In 
other words death is normalized within a familiar and comfortable academic 
discourse and so loses its capacity to make us face fundamental ethical questions 
about how we live our lives.  
This metaphorical tradition contrasts sharply with work broadly inspired by Freud, a 
thinker who has been an important influence on writing concerning death within 
organization studies.  Such work has the advantage, from our perspective, of treating 
death as something more profound than merely as a metaphor (Carr and Lapp 2005; 
Fotaki 2006; Lapierre 1989; Menzies 1960).  It also stresses the way in which the fear 
and subsequent repression of death can lead to the identification of individuals with 
their organizations in ethically problematic ways.  Of particular relevance to 
organization studies is the idea that individuals shore up a fantasy of immortality by 
identifying with institutions that promise to outlive them.  Institutions thus become a 
symbolic substitute for personal immortality (Bauman 1992; Clark 1993; Sievers 
1994) and are seen as an idealised version of ourselves (Carr and Lapp 2005; 
Feldman 2004; Schwartz 1987). 
This identification of ourselves with organizations and the issues that arise when 
they fail to deliver symbolic immortality is a theme examined by a number of writers 
in organization studies.  Lapierre (1989) argues that this identification on the part of 
senior managers may give rise to unwarranted feelings of omnipotence.  For other 
organizational members, identification may lead to strong feelings of grief and loss 
when organizations fail, change or perhaps when we fail to progress, or lose our 
place, in them (Barton Cunningham 1997).   Barton Cunningham (1997) goes on to 
propose an essentially therapeutic response to this symbolic death: how can 
managers guide organizational survivors through the stages of grief suggested by the 
ubiquitous Kübler-Ross (1970) framework?  Lapierre (1989) also suggests that the 
terror of death may be incorporated into managerial roles, that the successful leader 
can integrate loss and a sense of powerlessness into their leadership practice and so 
enhance their effectiveness.   
Some writing within organization studies, however, does take a more critical ethical 
standpoint on death.  Denhardt writes that ‘the relationship between the master and 
slave may well be rooted in the efforts of masters to seek their own fortunes (their 
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own immortality) at the expense of the slave’s identity and aspirations’ (1987: 531).  
Extending this insight to organizations he argues that ‘some managers today 
conceive of their relationships with subordinates in a way consistent with the master-
slave archetype’ (Denhardt 1987: 536).  Similarly, Schwartz (1987) argues that the 
identification of individuals with the ‘immortal’ organization leads to organizational 
totalitarianism.  Furthermore, Sievers (1994) sees the repression of our knowledge of 
death as leading to oppressive social relations and the domination and exploitation of 
those at the bottom of the hierarchy. He argues that, as a result, organizations make 
extreme demands on their members in terms of obedience and sacrifice whilst at the 
same time restricting decision-making and knowledge to the most senior executives 
thus infantilizing those at lower levels (see also Stavrakakis 2008).  For Feldman 
(2004) the feelings of invulnerability on the part of senior managers that arise from 
the successful maintenance of a fantasy of immortality lie at the root of corporate 
scandals such as the collapse of the Enron Corporation. 
We find this more critical writing insightful in explicating how the avoidance of an 
awareness of our mortality leads to various forms of oppression and domination and 
so poses a useful warning of the dangers of over-identification of ourselves with 
organizations, for example through management approaches such as attempts to 
mould organizational culture (Hancock 1999).  In this sense it is congruent with 
Heideggerian thinking on death.  However, there is little sense that there is anything 
that individuals or groups might do to change this situation. Rather ‘in order to 
maintain that social life we have to conceal from ourselves the fact that the illusion 
[of immortality] is an illusion, the result is, inevitably, totalitarianism’ (Schwartz 
1987: 53).  These writers are clearly engaged in an ethical critique of the way our 
irrational natures tend to limit the identity of ourselves and others within relations of 
domination and fear, however, there is no suggestion of a remedy to this problem 
other than an understanding of it leading to greater acceptance that this is how 
things must be. 
To summarise the review, we believe that some of the existing work on death in 
organizational studies does suggest a number of useful insights about organizational 
life. However, there are also some serious limitations associated with it. We would 
argue that much work, either unproblematically harnesses these insights in the 
service of managerialism or, where an ethical dimension is present, offers no remedy 
to the problems of aggressiveness, self-destructiveness, domination, guilt, shame and 
loss in organizations because they are seen as inherent in our psychic development.  
It is for this reason that we now turn to Heidegger’s thinking on death – a literature 
about which organizational studies is largely silent.  Whilst Heidegger’s thought 
shares with more critical organizational work on death the conviction that immersion 
in institutions serves as a way of avoiding confronting our finitude (see Denhardt 
1987: Schwartz 1987; Willmott 2000; Smith 2006), it demands a very different 
response. 
Heidegger and Death 
In this section we outline Heidegger’s writing on death drawing attention to its 
ethical implications.  We draw predominantly on his major and perhaps most 
influential work Being and Time (1926/1962), not least because his analysis of what 
constitutes authentic being hinges on the significance of death for our lives.  We also 
draw on some of his later writing where he develops his ideas on the effects of 
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technological rationality on human existence as this has particular implications for 
the ethical dimension of organization.  Before we begin our analysis it is also worth 
noting that although Heidegger introduced important ethical concepts such as ‘Being 
with’, ‘solicitude’, and ‘authenticity’ (1926/1962) , he was extremely reluctant to 
develop them in any systematic way (Hodge 1995).  Indeed there are many seeming 
contradictions in his discussion of these ideas that make any straightforward 
retrieval of an ethics from Heidegger extremely problematic (Olafson 1998).  In this 
sense, in our discussion we are drawing on a Heideggerian ethics (which is to say an 
ethics inspired by his thought) rather than an ethics explicitly stated in Heidegger’s 
writings. 
It is clear, however, that Heidegger places ethics, freedom, choice, and relations to 
others at the heart of what it means to be a human being (Manning 1973). It is also 
possible to argue, as we do below, that Heidegger’s ethics of finitude might provide a 
foundation for resistance to what is seen as the increasing encroachment of 
managerialism on the way we define ourselves (Hancock and Tyler 2004; 
Learmonth, 2009).  This convergence of ethics with selfhood begs the question: what 
kind of organization might facilitate the practice of the Heideggerian virtues of 
resoluteness and the mindful pursuit of our own life projects?  
Heidegger treats death as an occasion for ethical choices in pursuit of an authentic 
life.  In Being and Time (1926/1962), he turns to the philosophical question of Being 
or existence.  The nature of Being in general is approached through investigating our 
own human being, what Heidegger calls Dasein.  Heidegger sees human being as 
essentially temporal: we are thrown into the present by our pasts and we make 
choices from the possibilities afforded to us by our present and thus we shape our 
futures.  To be human, therefore, is always to choose, albeit our choices are 
constrained by our historical location, individual circumstances and our past 
decisions.  Existence is therefore always provisional and changing and we are always 
oriented to our future choices (Mulhall 1996; Polt 1999). 
As we have mentioned above, Heidegger was very reluctant to prescribe how lives 
should be lived, but his writing does suggest an ethics of existence through the 
concept of authenticity, a general orientation to how choices should be made.  In 
Being and Time, Heidegger develops the concept of authenticity through a 
discussion of death.  Beginning from the uncontroversial idea that death ends the 
temporal succession of possibility, Heidegger points out that it also simultaneously 
enables a whole life to be seen in its totality, for the story is now complete and no 
more changes to the plot or protagonist are possible (Heidegger 1926/1962).  He also 
writes that as a result ‘death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost’ 
(1926/1962: 294). 
How can the event which brings all possibility for me to an end also be my ‘ownmost 
possibility’?  What Heidegger is alluding to is that death points to two essential 
existential properties of Dasein.  One is the ‘mineness’ of existence.  No-one can die 
my death for me.  In the end, career or organizational ‘death’ is not the same as my 
death and so the writing on death in organizational studies that conflates the 
metaphorical with our personal mortality serves as an unethical distancing of 
ourselves from our own finitude.  Even saving someone’s life by giving my own 
cannot prevent them from dying their own death; it can merely postpone or alter it.  
In this sense our death strips away all relations to others and isolates us in our own 
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unique, irreplaceable, singular selves (Derrida, 1995; Mulhall, 1996).  The second 
aspect of death as ownmost possibility relates to the seemingly paradoxical idea of 
death as possibility rather than absolute certainty.  This idea is related to the 
apprehension that every moment of our lives could be our last; indeed Heidegger 
proposes that we should live our lives and make our choices in the full awareness 
that this is the case.  We should resolutely look our finitude in the face because to do 
so shakes us out of a refusal to make choices.   
Most of the time we avoid confronting the fact of our deaths and choose not to 
choose, we prefer to conform ourselves to dominant norms and not reflect on the 
choices that we make in everyday life.  To simplify a little, such norms are 
characterised by Heidegger as das Man, (translated as the ‘they’ or the ‘anyone’).  In 
other words, despite the possibility of choice, we mostly allow ourselves to become 
the passive consumers of dominant discourses (Kearney 1994). As Heidegger himself 
put it: 
It is already a matter of public acceptance that ‘thinking about death’ is a 
cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of 
fleeing from the world. The ‘they’ does not permit us the courage for anxiety in 
the face of death. (1926/1962: 298).   
To acknowledge that only we can die our deaths leads, he argues, to the realisation 
that only we can live our own lives.  Thus Heidegger insists that an authentic life 
resides in facing up to these choices and not allowing ourselves to be absorbed by 
trivialities or placing ourselves in self-imposed servitude to the ‘they’ (Mulhall, 1996; 
Polt, 1999).  This is not to say that Heidegger is suggesting a disengagement from 
everyday being-in-the-world.  Indeed he characterises engagement with the world 
and others as a more authentic state than a detached theorising about the world.  
Existential choices do not therefore preclude unreflective absorption in pleasurable 
activities, the freedom from the ego that comes from immersion in the present flow 
of events (Mainemelis 2001; Sudnow 1978).  However, from a Heideggerian 
perspective one should still consciously choose which of these activities one will 
pursue rather than others on the basis of the sort of life we wish to have. 
Heidegger believes that we suppress our knowledge of our own mortality because it is 
unimaginable to us and generates fear and anxiety.  However, he believes that we can 
and should face up to our deaths with resoluteness in order to find the freedom to 
make our own choices.  Levinas (1947/1987), in the development of his ethics of 
alterity, criticized Heidegger for what he saw as a subsequent over-individualization 
of human existence.  The authentic individual can appear to be a solitary hero who 
makes decisions independently of others (ten Bos 2002).  However, Heidegger’s 
attitude towards sociality has been argued to be more complex than this (Olafson 
1998; Vogel 1994).  Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein, or ‘being-with’ suggests that a 
shared resoluteness in the face of death leads to a liberating solicitude, ‘a posture in 
which one feels an obligation to respect the dignity of other persons and compassion 
for the suffering of others’ (Vogel 1994: 9).  Thus one can extend the concept of 
authenticity to the ‘We’, when each feels that she belongs to a common project yet 
encourages the others to pursue the project in a way that attests to their own 
individuality.   
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Unlike the work on death within organizational studies evaluated above, our reading 
of Heidegger therefore suggests a much more active ethical stance towards our 
membership of organizations that calls for a constant evaluation of our purposes and 
actions within them in the face of the ever present possibility of our deaths.  
According to the ethics of authenticity we always remain responsible for ourselves 
and our choices.  This implies a high degree of wariness towards the pursuit of status, 
power and careers available within organizations, because they frequently act as a 
seduction towards conformity, which in turn preventing the individual from making 
self-conscious and responsible choices.  Heidegger’s work implies that the 
organizations we interact with ought ideally to enable us to work-alongside and with 
others without being forced to conform to norms that tranquilise our understanding 
of ourselves and the world.  The challenge therefore that Heidegger’s thinking on 
death has for organization scholars is whether and how work organizations could 
provide productive ways of being-alongside-with-others without inducing a dull 
conformity or overly restricting our freedom. 
Heidegger argues that repression of the knowledge of our mortality gives rise to 
problematic relations with each other and leads to our absorption in organizations 
which then prevent us living truly human lives for ourselves and others.  But where 
Heideggerian thought differs from the work reviewed above is that it does not accept 
that this is inevitable. Rather it suggests that we have a responsibility to choose a self 
project in the light of our mortality that has implications for relations to others and 
to the organization of work. In the next section we relate this ethical position to more 
critical approaches to business ethics exploring how it might extend and facilitate a 
life worth living. 
Heidegger and the Ethics of Choice 
In recent years a number of organizational scholars have been highly critical of 
mainstream business ethics and have proposed alternative ethical approaches.  This 
work rejects the dominant conceptualisation of organizational ethics as the 
construction of codes of conduct in favour of considerations of ‘the essence of the 
ethical relation in general’ (Jones 2003: 225). Parker’s (2003) critique of code based 
business ethics identified a disconnect between business ethics, existential issues and 
politics that arises from its neglect of 20th century philosophy.  He also notes that 
even where business ethics invokes what might be thought to be intrinsically more 
politically oriented ethical frameworks such as virtue ethics it does so in a ‘de-
socialized’ manner.  A manner that takes the ethical out of ethics, constructing codes 
of conduct that negate the need for individual ethical choices concerning what might 
constitute a life worth living.  One simply follows the rules laid down by others.  
Heideggerian ethics shares this antipathy to codes of conduct rather ‘ethical enquiry 
has the form of praxis, transforming the identity of the enquirer’ (Hodge 1995: 17).  
For Heidegger the point of ethics is to uncover ‘how human beings are to flourish’ 
(1995: 14) and this uncovering is only possible if we face up to our finitude and so 
accept that what it is to be human is always temporary and in transition.  Heidegger, 
in his Letter on Humanism (1946/1993), elevated thinking and questioning as key 
ethical virtues, ones that will lead us to understand what we are; the starting point 
for deciding what we should do. 
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More radical work on organizational ethics echoes the Heideggerian insistence on the 
centrality of being conscious of our choices through constant questioning and 
thinking.  ten Bos, for example, suggests that we should permanently question ‘the 
experience in which we find ourselves’ (2002: 60).  To express this in Heideggerian 
terms, ethics consists in listening to the call of conscience and freeing ourselves from 
absorption in the ‘they’ by invoking our ability to choose for ourselves – thus 
‘morality concerns choice first of all’ (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007: 111).  
These are choices that are rooted in ‘the unwillingness to comply, the refusal to 
acquiesce, to fit ourselves in the practice through which we understand and rule 
ourselves and each other’ (ten Bos 2002: 60).  Where a Heideggerian ethics goes 
beyond such calls is in its linking of individual refusal with care for the other, a 
linkage that is constructed from a shared sense of finitude.   
A combination of individual questioning with care for the other is required if the 
predominantly individualised aesthetic formulation of refusal found in critical 
organizational ethics (see Hatchuel 1999: Chan 2002; Barratt 2004) is not to amount 
to a form of selfishness, one that is powerless to bring about institutional change.  
For we see such refusal as no solution in itself to the disconnect between business 
ethics and politics noted above. Additionally we have the problem of deciding how 
one can refuse one discourse of identity (say that of corporate man/woman) without 
simply enslaving oneself to another (say that of a critical management academic).  In 
other words, how does one know that in making such choices one is in fact free – and 
how might one differentiate between the value of different choices? 
The over individualisation of such a formulation of ethics may be countered by the 
development of Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein or ‘being-with’ (Heidegger 1926/1962).  
Lewis has argued that death plays a foundational role in the construction of a link 
between a Heideggerian ethics of the authentic individual and our relations to others 
‘necessitated by the presence of a being-with of mortals’ (2005: 3).  Lewis goes on to 
identify two Heideggerian forms of being-with, the inauthentic ‘in-order-to’ (2005: 
20), an instrumental use of individuals for our own ends, with the authentic ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’, where we recognise the mortality of the other.  Modern technocratic 
organizations encourage the former rather than the latter thus ‘we encounter beings 
as actualities in a calculative businesslike way’ (Heidegger 1946/1993: 223) and so 
close ourselves off to the mystery of being and the potential to become fully human.  
However, shared awareness of our own mortality rather leads to a sense of 
responsibility towards the other that we should enable the other to come into a full 
awareness of their existence and so our freedom depends upon their freedom. 
According to Heidegger ‘being with’ does not involve the incorporation of the other 
into ourselves (Olafson 1998).  Rather it involves letting the other be in their freedom 
for their own possibilities, leading to an authentic form of ‘we’ ‘when each feels that 
he belongs to a common project yet encourages the others to pursue the project in a 
way that attests to their own individuality’ (Vogel 1994: 79). Mitsein therefore 
implies a challenge to the Master-Slave dialectic that was noted above (Denhardt 
1987) which arises in organizations as a result denying our mortality and pursuing 
fantasies of immortality. Heidegger insists upon a moral claim that we should 
recognise that the other has their own answers to the question of what is right for 
them.  We may not impose our own choices onto them.  Imposing our will repudiates 
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the equivalence with which individuals should stand in relation to one another and 
so prevents the establishment of a moral community (Olafson 1998).  
Heidegger believed that questioning and thinking as regards our existential choices 
was being made ever more difficult as a result of modern forms of technological 
organization which prevent us from reflecting on who and what we are in favour of 
an immersion in non-reflective activities. Humanity as it has become ever more 
dependent upon and organized around modern forms of technology and technical 
organization becomes itself technologized, moulded by the requirements of its own 
creations.  Thus technological humanity, far from flourishing, is reduced to a form of 
animality (Heidegger 1946/1993).  Thus ‘we must free ourselves from the technical 
interpretation of thinking….a process of reflection in service to doing and making’ 
(1946/1993: 218).  Technology then strengthens the hold of the ‘they’ on us, ‘we are 
so filled with “logic” that anything that disturbs the habitual somnolence of 
prevailing opinion is automatically registered as a despicable contradiction’ 
(1946/1993: 250).  An awareness of death, however, can restore a sense of ourselves 
as autonomous moral agents ‘death presents technology…with an event that points 
towards something in excess of the actual, something that cannot be made effective 
or profitable’ (Lewis 2005: 85). This admittedly precarious and uncomfortable 
emancipation is based on the restoration of the possibility of an existence not entirely 
subsumed within the dominant discursive formations of organizational life, 
particularly the death-denying enterprise of the self (du Gay 1996) for such an 
enterprise relies on the unconscious acceptance of life as an ever-upward progress of 
individual development. 
What then are implications of the Heideggerian ethics of finitude for organizations?  
What would constitute a community of authentic selves, one in which technology and 
the ‘they’ do not prevent life projects being constructed in the light of ourselves as 
beings-toward-death?  These questions may be answered both at an individual and 
an organizational level.  To begin with the individual, a resolute facing up to death 
confronts each of us with what it means to have a unique, finite life and underscores 
the need to decide what our lives are for.  Such an awareness requires that we place 
our working lives in a wider context than is often the case in current organizational 
theory where ‘much of the research that is focussed on perceptions and practices in 
particular organizations neglects what is not immediately visible….the broader 
historical, cultural, institutional and political influences.’ (Alvesson, et al. 2008: 11).  
Such a facing up to death, although painful, may be emancipatory. The unthinking 
regulation of our selves via the pursuit of individual success or personal appearance 
is weakened as we contemplate death: both the high level of physical agency and the 
ability of our bodies to respond to such cultivation declines as we approach our 
deaths. 
In addition, an awareness of our ageing and dying bodies potentially limits the power 
of certain discourses of the organizational self.  It is hard to avoid a sense of futility 
when building our identities around consumption, appearance, status, and stable, 
predictable, institutionalised routines when one confronts death (Willmott 2000).  
Death reminds us that lives spent in the cultivation of our social position, perhaps via 
career success, or pursuing compensation for bodily decay through the achievement 
of powerful positions in organizations, are ultimately doomed – they are simply 
rearguard actions in a relentless defeat.  This being so, a consideration of death may 
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free us from the allure of many characteristic discourses of a consumerist or careerist 
modernity – and so suggest one way in which such disciplinary norms may be 
resisted. du Gay (1996), for example, has argued that the discourse of individual 
success is the dominant way in which modern individuals construct their identities 
within work organizations.  As such resolute facing up to death has the potential to 
cause profound disruption to our usual conformity to such powerful discursive 
influences.  For death encourages a more intersubjective view of our relations to 
others in organizations shifting our attention to how we would like to be remembered 
by those most important to us.  Facing up to death thus restores the link between 
existential ethics and the politics that underlie the cult of individual success within 
modern societies. 
Implications for Organization Studies 
The redirecting of ethics in response to an awareness of death has many implications 
for the work of organization scholars. If, as Manning (1973) argues, social theory has 
failed to explicate our lives for ourselves, then Heidegger directs us back from this 
indifference to the existential issues that matter to us. For example, much work 
within organization studies uncritically stresses the need for ever greater 
identification with them, extolling the value of teamwork (Finn, et al. 2010) or the 
need to participate in a ‘strong’ culture (Latta 2009). Whilst critical organizational 
scholars have pointed out the potentially oppressive effects of such identification 
(Willmott 1993; Costas and Fleming 2009) they have not indicated how it might be 
escaped.  According to Heideggerian thought, a resolute facing up to death provides 
for the possibility of emancipating ourselves from the hegemony of such ideas which 
are seen as a way of enslaving ourselves to the ‘they’.  This gives organization studies 
an impetus to conceptualize both the difficulties and possibilities of freedom from 
over-identification.   
Heidegger raises a number of additional ethical imperatives for organizational 
scholars.  If we ourselves are facing up to our deaths we will be constantly evaluating 
what our work is for and who it serves.  Does it contribute to the fostering of 
organizations that exist ultimately for the satisfaction of human needs and human 
flourishing or to the maintenance of the avoidance of our ethical choices through 
conformity to the ‘they’?  Does our research focus on narrow self-referential 
abstractions designed to increase our standing within our own route to death-
denying individual success within the academy or does it seek to increase a sense of 
human solidarity illuminating the lives of others in organizations in empathetic ways 
(Rorty 1989)?  To what extent do we exhibit in our writing and practice a treatment 
of others that reflects the principle of ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (Lewis 2005: 20) 
discussed above?  Does our engagement with management students and managers 
seek to inculcate the Heideggerian virtues of thinking and questioning, as well as a 
liberating solicitude for others?  Such questions suggest in turn empirical lines of 
enquiry such as whether and how the experience of death or near death leads to 
instances of greater solicitude or to re-doubled efforts to deny the reality of 
mortality?  This implies studies that investigate what Sköldberg terms ‘existential 
limit situations’ (1998: 87) that involve anxiety, guilt and death.  In many ways our 
own experiences and reflections give us the most direct access to such situations 
rather than the traditional role of objective detached researcher. 
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These implications link the individual ethical choices of organizational scholars and 
organizational members to the nature of organizations themselves. If a resolute 
facing up to death raises the possibility of giving us a place to stand that is beyond 
the reach of many modern discourses of self (as if we were already dead (Derrida 
1996)) it also suggests a way of reconnecting relations to the other and a wider 
politics. As we have already noted according to Heidegger living our lives in the full 
awareness of our mortality leads to solicitude for the other, a mortal like ourselves.  A 
reflection on death thus prompts us to reconsider the highly individualised 
conception of modern identities that informs much organization theory (Giddens 
1991; Hepworth 1986; Lasch 1980; Rose 1999; Sennett 1998) and encourages us to 
consider a more inter-subjective view and the need for organizations to act as 
mutually supportive communities (Parker 1998, 2003).  Extended to the institutional 
level then, organizations should enable both our individual freedom and the exercise 
of responsibility to the other.   
A further implication is that the formulation, discussion and critique of what such 
ethical organizations might be like should be a central concern of the discipline.  One 
implication of the work reviewed above is that hierarchy and the pursuit of career 
success within it are responses to and further encourage the avoidance of our own 
finitude.  Manning (1973) suggests that the ability to escape conformity to the ‘they’ 
is inherently political arguing that researchers should consider how superordinate 
groups are able to restrict the choices of others in considering their life projects.  We 
would go further than Manning by arguing that we need to move beyond critique to 
proposing how organizations could produce goods essential for practical human 
needs whilst at the same time enabling a broader diversity of choices regarding our 
existential needs.  Indeed we argue that such questions ought to become the central 
problematic for organizational studies.  
Reframing the political aims of critical organizational studies as the proposal of 
alternative models of organization would contrast strongly with the essentially 
negative character towards which much critical writing on ethics has tended (Parker 
1998).  Heideggerian ethics implies organizations whose members have a right to 
fundamentally question their organizations’ purposes and actions; where reflection 
on whether an organization is fostering human flourishing or not is a persistent 
feature of it rather than the submergence of such questions in the rush to produce 
and consume; where community and individual freedom are worked out with others 
all of whom have an equal right to determine their own answers to such questions.  
There is a small but growing strand of organizational studies that is studying 
organizations whose primary purpose is that of human flourishing (Parker 1997; 
Parker 1998; Parker 2002; Reedy 2002; Fournier 2006; Parker, et al. 2007; Reedy 
and Learmonth 2009).  The ethics suggested by this paper can be seen as a call for 
wider attention to be given to such work and to comparisons with those 
organizations whose sole purpose is the generation of wealth or high status for a few 
successful individuals within them.  In other words there are opportunities for 
empirical work in organizations where a Heideggerian praxis is being enacted that 
could provide organizational studies research with alternative and potentially 
emancipatory models of organization.  
One indicator of an alternative Heideggerian approach to work organization is 
apparent from his writing on technology.  Heidegger argued that technology has a 
13 
 
propensity to deaden our awareness of ourselves, resulting from what Kallinikos 
refers to as ‘the progressive narrowing of the functions and significations that pertain 
to the tool’ (Kallinikos 1992b: 130) but this deadening may be reversed by raising the 
status of work to that of art.  There are many references in Being and Time 
(1926/1962) to handicraft and the workshop and Heidegger refers constantly to the 
importance of the poetic in his later The Origin of the Work of Art (Heidegger 
1956/1993).  Zimmerman, developing these themes, argues that for humanity to live 
authentically on the earth requires ‘a world in which the integrity of things is 
preserved.  Such a world would be intrinsically ‘local’, bound up with place in a way 
wholly foreign to the planetary reach of modern technology’ (1990: 151). There are a 
growing number of organizations that exist to pursue aesthetic or existential 
objectives that are embedded in their local contexts but as yet few examples of their 
consideration within organizational studies. Thus the implications of an 
organizational ethics of finitude extend from individual resoluteness to the 
organization of work and the politics of global capitalism (see also Kallinikos 1992a). 
All this, in the context of modern organizations and the current political economy 
may appear rather utopian.  And yet, such organizations do exist where the 
flourishing of free individuals is a central rather than a peripheral concern (Parker, et 
al. 2007).  Organizational studies, in particular, could pay much more attention to 
such organizations and present them as alternatives to the dominance of mainstream 
conceptions of how organizations can and should be (Reedy and Learmonth 2009).  
The choices we all make about what is worth writing about should also be influenced 
by our knowledge of our own deaths and the precariousness of our existence as well 
as our responsibility towards each other.  All these thoughts return us to the opening 
question in this section: how we decide what our lives are for in the face of our 
mortality about which we now make some concluding reflections. 
Some Concluding Reflections   
In this paper we have sought to redress the neglect of an essential aspect of our lives: 
that of our death and its implications for how we think about organization and our 
relations to them and to each other.  In particular we have related Heidegger’s ethics 
of mortality to organization studies arguing that such an ethics makes an important 
contribution. It both fills the gaps in existing work on death as regards ethical 
possibilities for change, and provides one answer to the call of more critical 
approaches to organizational ethics to re-connect existential and political 
considerations with organizational life.   
We have argued that it is all too easy to immerse ourselves in the minutiae of day to 
day organizational life, forgetting, until brought up short by reflecting on death, the 
broader existential, ethical and political questions that membership of organizations 
entail.  It is also good to be reminded of the limitations of rational enquiry into the 
human condition – death may take place in and through organizations but it 
transcends organization as such. This transcendence tends to escape and confound 
our attempts to manage or even make sense of death including the discursive and 
symbolic systems that regulate and control death’s untoward, unruly and unsettling 
effects.  These effects result in the denial of death and the maintenance of fantasies of 
immortality but this denial leads to various forms of domination and a deadening 
conformity to the ‘they’.  On the other hand, to face up to death reframes all our 
projects, including our academic projects as a part of a wider but limited life where 
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relations to others and the world around us become the most important 
considerations when making choices about how to spend the always limited time at 
our disposal. 
Perhaps inevitably and appropriately then, our exploration of death leaves us with 
many uncomfortable questions and thoughts.  One of these is that, as the price of 
overcoming the repression of death is discomfort and fear, it is unlikely to be fully 
realised.  We ourselves remain ambivalent about swapping comfortable illusion and 
distracting activity for exposure to the full terror of responsibility for ourselves: after 
all the very writing of this paper may be seen as one more instance of an inauthentic 
distracting immersion in our own organizations and careers. 
Nevertheless, the paper has sought to open up a debate within organizational ethics 
about how we might make choices about our relations to organizations.  How do we 
decide on what a worthwhile life is for us and others in the light of our finitude?  
Such questions can always be postponed – but we hope that this paper serves as a 
reminder that the time to think about such things is always shorter than we realise.  
Despite its terror for us, we believe that facing up to death may paradoxically free us 
from unthinking obedience to norms and enable us to seek more fulfilling forms of 
work and relations within organizations.  For organization scholars we believe that 
mortality lays an ethical injunction on us to reconnect politics and ethics in the 
service of organizations that enable our freedom and support our shared frailty. 
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